In response to Assembly Bill 32, the State of California is considering three types of carbon emissions trading programs for the electric power sector: load-based, source-based and first-seller. They differ in terms of their point-of-regulation and in whether in-state-to-out-of-state and out-of-state-to-in-state electricity sales are regulated. In this paper, we formulate a market equilibrium model for each of the three approaches, considering power markets, transmission limitations and emissions trading, and making the simplifying assumption of pure bilateral markets. We analyze the properties of their solutions and show the equivalence of load-based, first-seller and source-based approaches when in-state to out-of-state sales are regulated under the cap. A numeric example illustrates the emissions and economic implications of the models. In the simulated cases, "leakage" eliminates most of the emissions reductions that the regulations attempt to impose. Further, "contract reshuffling" occurs to such an extent that all the apparent emissions reductions resulting from changes in sources of imported power are illusory.
Introduction
Due to a lack of federal leadership, a number of states in the U.S. have taken actions to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The efforts by the western and the eastern states are called the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), respectively. Among the WCI states, the State of California is the first state to adopt legislation limiting GHGs. On September 27, 2006, the state of California passed a comprehensive bill -AB32 "The Global Warming Solutions Act" -that aims at reducing in-state GHG emissions from various sectors to 1990 levels by 2020, or 25% reduction compared to the business-as-usual scenario. AB32 is the first climate change legislation in the U.S. that would regulate most polluting sectors in an economy. Led by the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) in consultation with other agencies, a state-wide emission cap is expected to be in effect by 2012. This is expected to be accomplished with a suite of instruments such as a low-carbon fuel standard for vehicles that would reduce GHGs of transportation fuels by at least 10% by 2020 (6). Table 1 summarizes the jurisdictional coverage of the programs analyzed in this paper. Two versions each of the source-and load-based programs are considered, differing in their treatment of power imports or exports. Together with the first-seller system, this means that we analyze five systems. We refer to the two source-based systems as the "pure" and "modified" systems. The pure source-based system is equivalent to traditional cap-and-trade programs and applies to only generation by California power plants. Meanwhile, the modified source-based approach expands coverage to include imports (i.e., out-of-state to in-state sales). Similarly, the pure load-based approach imposes an emissions cap on California LSEs, including the emissions of power they import, whereas the modified load-based approach, in addition, regulates in-state to out-of-state electricity sales. The modified rather than pure approaches are of most interest here because they both attempt to account for emissions from out-of-state power production, and are therefore the main focus of our analyses. Finally, the first-seller approach is a hybrid of source-and load-based approaches, where the emissions associated with the first-seller's sales come under the cap, with California generators being responsible for their emissions and the LSEs being responsible for emissions associated with imports. The biggest drawback of the pure source-based approach is its inability to count emissions from imported electricity (i.e., carbon leakage). This "leakage" of emissions turns out to be crucial in regulating regional GHG emissions given that California is a net importer, and its generators are relatively clean compared with other western states. The first-seller and modified source-based approaches represent attempts to correct that problem. As our simulations show later in this paper, however, these approaches are not necessarily effective in preventing leakage. In contrast, while either the modified load-based or pure load-based approaches might address CO 2 leakage, other potential problems with load-based problems have been identified. One issue is whether implementation of a program that places responsibility for compliance upon LSEs would interfere with the operation of the day-ahead and real-time pool-based markets by providing incentives for clean generation to avoid those markets (25) . The other concern is whether such an approach would lead to so-called contract shuffling that would eventually result in little or no actual emissions reduction (3) . To the extent that there are large amounts of clean energy sources that could compete for contracts to sell into California, the likelihood of shuffling increases. On the other hand, an often cited advantage for load-based approach is that it might increase the incentive for LSEs to invest in demand side management and improved energy efficiency (3) . Another claimed advantage is that by paying only a premium for clean power sources, consumer costs would be less than in a source-based system in which the opportunity cost of allowances for marginal power sources would raise the price of all power supply (12) . As shown in the later sections, our findings directly refute such assertion and conclude that load-based approach does not have such advantage over other approaches. Finally, whether any proposal that would regulate imported power (loadbased, modified source-based and first-seller) would survive a challenge based upon the Interstate Commerce Clause is an important question. (Further discussion of the three approaches in terms of potential legal challenges, ability to prevent leakage and potential interference with electricity market operations can be found in elsewhere (3) (17) .)
While there is no general consensus about which approach is most appropriate for California, a lack of careful analysis of their economic implications makes the choice even harder. This paper focuses on analyzing the three proposed approaches that include power imports and exports (i.e., modified load-based, modified source-based and first-seller programs), but also considers the pure load-and source-based approaches. We address the following questions assuming that emissions associated with California's electricity consumption are required to meet the same CO 2 emission cap under three approaches. These questions are, first, do the approaches lead to different emissions allowances prices and electricity prices? The second question concerns income distribution: are profits and consumer costs the same among the proposals? Third, how do the proposals compare in terms of contract-shuffling and CO 2 leakage?
To answer these questions, we conduct a general theoretical analysis of the three approaches that regulate emissions of imports and exports and show their equivalence. (An earlier analysis that drew the same conclusion for load-and source-based programs, without considering imports, is Southern California Edison (13) .) We also conduct numerical simulations of six cases using a three-zone market, with one capped zone (representing California) and two zones that export to California. Cases 1-3 are the modified source-based, modified load-based and first-seller approaches. Cases 4-6 correspond to pure source-based, pure load-based approaches and no cap (baseline), respectively. The pure cases show how emissions leakage and contract reshuffling can change relative to the modified cases. We report results concerning profits, consumer costs, social welfare, electricity and allowances prices, electricity sales, and CO 2 emissions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the mathematical formulations of the market equilibrium problems for the modified source-based, modified load-based and first-seller approaches will be introduced. These are complementarity formulations in which each market participant solves an optimization problem (profit-maximization for generators, consumer net benefit maximization for LSEs, and maximization of transmission value for the Independent System Operator (ISO)), and market clearing conditions are imposed. In Section 3, the properties of the solutions of the three models will be discussed. In particular, we show equivalence of the three proposals. We discuss the results of the numerical example in Section 4, focusing on economic and emissions outcomes as well as the issues of CO 2 leakage and contract shuffling. Conclusions and policy implications are addressed in Section 5. The theoretical proofs and data used in the economic and emissions analysis are included in the Appendix A.
Models
This section introduces the mathematical formulation of the three main proposals that regulate emissions of imports (modified load-based, modified source-based and first-seller). Within each proposal, optimization problems faced by LSEs, power producers and an ISO are presented. Market clearing conditions will also be specified. The formulations are a generalization of Hobbs (15) , accounting for allowances markets and differences in points of regulation among the proposals. Examples of previous studies that also analyze electricity markets using complementarity models include (1, 2, 24) . (Note that we also adopt the same hub-spoke type of modeling of a transmission network as in Hobbs (15) . Within such a modeling framework, an arbitrary bus is designated as the hub, and routing from node a to node b is as if from node a to the hub, and then from the hub to node b.)
We first summarize the notation to be used in the models. 
I
Set of electricity production zones that are under CO 2 regulation; I ⊂ N and |I| = I J Set of demand zones that are under CO 2 regulation; J ⊂ N and |J | = J A Set of (directional) transmission links in the network N ; |A| = 2J F Set of power producers; |F| = F F C ⊂ F Set of power producers under the emissions cap H Set of generating units i, j ∈ N Zones i, j are in the power generation network f ∈ F Power producer f h ∈ H Generator h h ∈ H i,f ⊂ H Generator h belongs to power firm f and is in zone i (Note that the h index is not essential and can be dropped. This point is illustrated further in Section 3.) 
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Modified Source-based Emissions Trading Program
Under the modified source-based program, the compliance liability is with generators as long as a producer sells electricity to in-state consumers. In-state sources that export also must comply. This is in contrast to our pure source-based system, in which out-of-state sources are exempted from regulation when selling electricity to in-state customers. In what follows, we summarize the optimization problems faced by LSEs, producers and the ISO, followed by their optimality conditions and market clearing conditions. Under a source-based approach within a perfectly competitive market, an LSE is simply a price taker. The LSE is assumed to act to maximize the net benefits received by its consumers; if demand was perfectly inelastic, this would be the same as minimizing consumer costs. The benefit function is the integral of the consumers' demand curve, assumed to equal their willingness-to-pay for electricity. The demand curve is:
In a source-based system, the LSE's costs include only the expense of power. Power is procured through bilateral contracts.
Under the modified source-based program, all producers selling in the regulated zones have to buy allowances. Since importers are also subject to the emissions cap, out-of-state imports need to buy CO 2 allowances from the allowances market to cover the electricity they deliver to California. (An important policy issue under this approach would be whether the CO 2 allowances for in-state sources should be auctioned. It is likely to be argued on discrimination grounds that if allowances are allocated for free to in-state sources, then imports should also receive allowances. A system that allocates allowances for free only to in-state generation would be subject to a commerce clausebased challenge. Avoiding this by allocating allowances to imports, however, would be difficult because CO 2 emissions associated with imports cannot be unambiguously determined. (How to allocate allowances and how to distribute economic rents associated with those allowances are issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.) Here, we only consider a scenario in which in-state power producers have an initial fixed endowment of allowances (obtained either by auctions or other means), while imports have to purchase allowances. It turns out the initial fixed endowments do not affect power producers' decisions, given that the producers behave competitively in both the electricity and allowances markets.
Producer f solves the following optimization problem.
The first term within the last parenthesis (i.e., i∈N C ,h∈H i,f ,j∈N
is the emissions associated with in-state sources, no matter where the electricity is sold; whereas the second term (i.e.,
is the emissions of imported electricity. Because of linearity in the DC network, consistent with the formulation elsewhere (15) , all generation and sales can be modeled as being routed through the hub zone. Thus, a generator receives w i for providing counterflow to the hub from its location and then pays w j to deliver power for sale from the hub to customers at j. The two constraints are capacity and sales balance constraints. Within this paper, we make the blanket assumption that the cost function C f ih is convex and differentiable for each f ∈ F, i ∈ N , and h ∈ H. It follows that Problem (2) is convex in its own variables (s, x) for each f ∈ F (that is, any local optimum to the problem is also a global optimum). (Here we assume that producers absorb all costs incurred by transmission congestion and add the costs to the market price of electricity. Alternative assumptions could be made, but would not affect our fundamental equivalence results.) In addition, since the constraints in a firm's profit optimization problem are all linear, the linear constraint qualification holds at any feasible point. Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal solution to satisfy is given by the following first-order conditions:
If x f ihj is greater than zero (therefore, s f j > 0) and subject to an emissions cap, the above conditions indicate that the power price in a CO 2 -capped region is equal to the sum of marginal cost (∇C f ih ( j∈N x f ihj )), the transmission charge (w i ), the CO 2 cost (p CO 2 E f ih ) and a scarcity rent if the output is at its upper bound (ρ f ih ). The term p CO 2 E f ih is omitted when x f ihj is not subject to the emissions cap. Notice that the allowance position (i.e., K P f ), a firm's initial possession of allowances, does not enter into the optimality conditions. Hence, as long as firms treat their grant of allowances as exogenous and their allocations are not linked to firms' future generation, how allowances are allocated does not affect the firms' behavior. That said, allocation of the allowances does affect the distribution of economic rents.
The system operator is assumed to maximize the value of the transmission network, without strategically manipulating power flows to earn profits. We use the same formulation as in Metzler et al. (19) .
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Two sets of market clearing conditions are associated with this problem. Respectively, they determine the charges for transmission by acting as a central auctioneer to auction off scarce transmission capacity and CO 2 allowance prices. Note that E could be equal to f K P f , but in general they could differ if some of the allowances are retained by the government for other purposes, such as price control or reservation for new entrants.
The first line in (6) is a mass-balance equation that defines the nodal withdraw or injection. Pre-multiply y i with PTDF matrix would give the flows along each transmission line in the network. Note that the first equation in (6) implies that
Hence, the corresponding equation in formulation (5) is redundant. We refer to the system consisting of formulations (1), (3), (5) and (6) as the modified source-based model, or Model SB.
Modified Load-based Emissions Trading Program
A pure load-based emissions trading program assigns compliance requirements to in-state LSEs. Consequently, an in-state generation source would not be subject to any emissions regulation if it exports electricity to out-of-state loads. Hence, total in-state GHG emissions may not be reduced. Such an outcome would conflict with the program's purpose to curb GHG emissions through a cap-and-trade program. One remedy is to put in-state generating sources that export to out-state loads, along with in-state LSEs, under GHG regulation. This is what we refer to as the "modified" load-based approach, and it is the main focus of this subsection. To our knowledge, there is no proposed load-based program that attempts to regulate in-state to out-of-state sales. It might be a precautionary requirement, however, to prevent producers from taking advantage of programs to increase their exports or to do "round-trip" trades. When considering the modified load-based approach, we partition LSEs into two groups: those under cap-and-trade programs (i.e., j ∈ N C ) and those not under cap-and-trade (i.e., j ∈ N N ). We follow the same assumptions as in Section 2.1 and model a market in which LSEs buy power through bilateral contracts with generators. However, a subtle difference remains regarding bilateral markets under the source-based approach versus the load-based approach. Strictly speaking, the load-based scheme requires LSEs to trace the exact source of each MWh of electricity procured, to accurately account for the emissions rate, while the source-based scheme has no such requirement. As a result, we were able to use a more general term s f j to represent firm f 's sales to demand zone j in the source-based approach, but under the load-based approach, we need to use variables with finer granularity, z f ihj and x f ihj , to model both the LSEs' problems and power producers' problems, respectively. An LSE in load zone j ∈ N attempts to maximize benefits of consumption (integral of the demand curve) minus payments to producers for power and, CO 2 emission allowances. For a zone that is subject to a CO 2 emissions cap (that is, j ∈ N C ), an LSE's problem is as follows.
However, such formulation does not imply that LSEs behave as a monopsony. The last two terms together can be interpreted as "pseudo supply curve," which incorporates costs of acquiring electricity from producers and pollution emissions. The objective function then becomes maximization of "pseudo social welfare," which the equilibrium is equivalent to perfect competition outcomes. The term, p
on or eight would be omitted when an LSE is not subject to emissions cap. Hence, this yields first-order conditions of two types for the LSEs as follows:
For all j ∈ N C with z f ihj > 0, based on the complementarity constraints (8) the following condition needs to be satisfied:
where the term p j represents the marginal benefit (per MWh) of consumers residing in j ∈ N C for electricity, regardless of its emissions rate. In other words, individual consumers are assumed to view electricity as a homogeneous product, regardless of the type of technology used to generate it. Therefore, their marginal benefit is always p j . In contrast, an LSE is subject to an emissions cap and treats electricity as a differential product with regard to emissions rates. However, LSEs are allowed to pass on CO 2 costs to consumers in the price of electricity. The term
is the expenditure by an LSE to purchase one MWh of electricity from a specific generator with an emission rate of E f ih . Thus, if a generator has a high emissions rate, it would receive less revenue per MWh compared to cleaner sources. Finally, in a program that instead awards allowances to LSEs in proportion to their load, the terms in the last parenthesis of the objective function in Problem (7) will be replaced with
, where R L is the target or default emissions rate.
In the load-based approach, power producers do not face CO 2 emissions regulation, except for exports from in-state sources to out-of-state consumers. In this situation, in-state generators have to purchase CO 2 allowances to ship power out of the state. This ensures that all emissions within Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS the state are covered by the program. The producer f 's profit maximization problem is shown below:
The optimality conditions of Problem (9) are given below.
The ISO's problem is the same as in the source-based approach (4). The new set of marketclearing conditions are as follows.
We refer to the model consisting of equations (8), (10), (5) and (11) as the modified load-based model, or Model LB.
First-Seller Emissions Trading Scheme
In the first-seller approach we consider here, the point of regulation is the first entity that brings energy into California. Our interpretation is that for the in-state generating sources, the first-seller approach is equivalent to the source-based approach. In our model setting, we do not consider power producers buying electricity from other firms, nor do we consider power marketers. Hence, only LSEs are responsible in our model for bringing out-of-state power into California if imports are needed or more economical. Consequently, in the first-seller approach, imports are treated the same way as in the load-based approach, where the LSEs are the point of regulation. The first-seller approach can therefore be viewed as a hybrid of the source-based and load-based approaches. It could instead be assumed, for example, that a third importing party is responsible for imports (i.e., first-deliverer approach), but this would not materially affect the conclusions of our analysis.
Again we assume that LSEs explicitly sign bilateral contracts with generators to provide electricity to a specified zone j ∈ N . Also, there are in-state LSEs and out-of-state LSEs. Under the first-seller scheme, an in-state LSE (i.e., j ∈ N C ) faces a profit optimization problem as follows.
While for an out-of-state LSE, there is no cost or profit associated with CO 2 emissions:
The last term within the parenthesis of the objective function in Problem (12) would be modified to
) when facing a program that awards allowances in proportion to sales. R F is the default or target emissions under the first-seller program. The same modification should be applied to Problem (15) .
The first-order conditions of the LSEs' problems are as follows.
Power producer f 's problem under the first-seller approach is stated below. Notice that CO 2 -related costs or revenues only apply to in-state generating sources.
The optimality conditions for a power producer f ∈ F are shown below, where the term p CO 2 E f ih is omitted for out-of-state sources.
The ISO's problem is exactly the same as in the source-based approach.
The market clearing conditions under the first-seller approach are given below.
We refer to the system consisting of (14), (16), (5) and (17) as the first-seller model, or Model FS.
Properties of the Models
In this section, we present some properties of the three market models (modified source-and load-based and first-seller) introduced above. The properties show that under mild conditions, the models constructed in the previous section are well-posed in the sense that an equilibrium exists in each of the models. More importantly, the properties show that although the three approaches to implement a cap-and-trade program are structurally different, electricity producers' generation patterns and costs are the same and so are the total GHG emissions and consumer surpluses. Robustness of the results with respect to the assumptions is also discussed.
Existence and Uniquess
The following results summarize the model properties. For a more succinct presentation, technical proofs appear in the Appendix A. These proofs proceed in the same manner as in Metzler et al. (19) .
(for easier presentation, in proving the existence and uniqueness results, we make the assumption that H i,f is a singleton for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N . This is not a restrictive assumption. If a zone i ∈ N has several generators, we can expand the network N to make each of the generator a single zone. Denote the newly added zones asÑ (i) and the set of all the adjacent zones of i in the original network as J (i). Then for each j ∈ J (i) and i ∈Ñ (i), connect them with a link with infinite capacity. Then the resulted expanded network will not alter any firms' or consumers' decisions that are made in the original network. Under this simplifying assumption, we can eliminate h indices from all variables and constraints.) Theorem 2. Let a vector b represent the common variables shared by the three models; that is, b = (x, ρ, w, y, η, λ, p CO 2 ). Assume that the system-wide CO 2 caps among the three models are the same; namely,
Then the following statements are equivalent. Some of the results to be shown in the next theorem strictly require convexity of the production cost function with respect to total generation. (To be more precise, they are items (b) and (c) in Theorem 3.) Assume that the cost function for each firm f ∈ F at a zone i ∈ N is as follows.
In addition, we assume that d f i > 0 for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N . To show the uniqueness and equivalence of consumer surpluses in the equilibria of the three models, we assume that consumers' willingness to pay is captured by a linear inverse demand function, as in Section 2. Consumers' surplus is the integral of the inverse demand function minus the costs for purchasing electricity. LSEs are assumed to charge consumers the marginal cost of supplying electricity, including the shadow price of allowances; in equilibrium, this is the marginal willingness to pay. The resulting expression for consumers' surplus is given below:
where
An alternative expression for the consumers' surplus could be derived from the assumption that all LSE profits (e.g., resulting from free granting of allowances) are returned to consumers as a lump-sum payment. That is, LSEs are regulated entities (as the largest ones are in California), but lump sum costs or revenues from the fixed allocations of allowances are rebated to consumers in a way that does not distort consumption. Furthermore, an assumption could also be made that all allowances rents earned by producers in the SB and FS models are actually returned to consumers, for example, because allowances are auctioned with the proceeds going to consumers.
Theorem 3. Assume that the set of solutions to any of the three models is nonempty. Under the same condition (18) as in Theorem 2, together with the cost function (19), the following statements are true for the equilibrium solutions of the three models.
(a) The total sales to each LSE j ∈ N are unique and are the same across the three models. (b) Firm f 's total production in each production zone i ∈ N is unique and the same across the three models, for each f ∈ F; (c) Total emissions are unique and are the same across the three models.
(d) The consumers' marginal willingness-to-pay (price charged to consumers) is unique at each zone j ∈ N and are the same across the three models. in addition, the consumers' surpluses are unique and the same across the three models.
(e) Assume that
where E is the initial CO 2 allowance. Then the total social welfare (the sum of consumers, producer, ISO and LSE surpluses) is unique and is the same across the three models.
The definition of consumers' surplus in the above theorem assumes that all allowance rents accrue to either LSEs or producers and none to consumers. As noted, regulation of LSEs and auctioning of allowances with the proceeds going to consumers could instead result in all allowances rents being returned to consumers. consumers' surplus would then increase by the amount of the rent, but would still be identical in each of the three systems.
Thus, we have refuted the assertion that has been made (12) that load-based systems result in lower costs to consumers than source-based systems because LSEs are able to price-discriminate among producers. Despite that price discrimination, the costs to consumers (more generally, their surpluses) are the same in all three systems.
Though total social welfare and consumers' surpluses are unique in each of the three equilibrium models, ISO's surplus, producers' surplus, and most interestingly, the market clearing price of CO 2 , may not be unique due to possible degeneracies created jointly by capacity constraints, transmission constraints and emissions constraints. An example is shown in the Appendix B. (Note that this example is to illustrate that even under the conditions of Theorem 3, the abovementioned 3 quantities are not necessarily unique. More general results regarding to under what conditions that these quantities are unique in an equilibrium are not readily available.)
Economic intuition
The equivalence result shown by Theorem may be surprising. However, the economic intuition is relatively simple. In the competitive market setting as laid out in the previous section, market outcomes can also be obtained by maximizing total social welfare, subject to three sets of constraints -capacity constraints, transmission constraints and emissions constraints. There may be internal wealth transfer among producers, LSEs, consumers and the ISO, causing different surplus distribution among these participants across the three proposed cap-and-trade systems. However, the internal wealth transfer would be cancelled out and does not affect aggregate social welfare. That is, the summation of all the surpluses remains the same regardless of the point of regulation of GHG emissions. The capacity and transmission constraints are certainly not affected by point of regulation either. Since all GHG emissions associated with electricity produced within or sold to California are accounted for, though at different points, the emissions constraints of the three GHG cap-and-trade programs (modified source-based, modified load-based, and first-seller) are expected to be equivalent as well. As a result, the equivalence of market outcomes as shown in Theorem 3 follows naturally.
Robustness of the results
Theorem 1 and 2 are derived under the assumptions that the cost functions of each generator is convex and differentiable. The differentiability should not be restrictive. One would expect that if a realistic cost function is indeed non-differentiable, the non-differentiability should only occur at a finite number of singletons in the form of kinks or jumps. As long as the cost functions are non-decreasing with respect to production quantities, the cost functions with kinks or jumps can be represented by piece-wise functions, with each piece being a differentiable function. Each piece of the piece-wise function can be considered as a cost function associated with a distinctive generator, and then the cost functions of all generators are differentiable (with a expanded set of generators). Consequently, all results presented above follow.
Convexity of cost functions is the key in deriving all the results above. However, we do not feel that this is a restrictive assumption either. Convex cost functions imply non-increasing marginal returns, which correspond to non-decreasing marginal cost functions. Since we do not consider investments or any fixed costs in our models, the marginal costs refer to short-run marginal costs. As illustrated in Considine (10), non-decreasing short-run marginal costs functions of generation units, which lead to convex cost functions, are generally observed and hence, are reasonable assumptions.
For Theorem 3, the assumption of strictly convex quadratic cost functions is indeed only needed for (b) and (c) (as can be seen through the proofs in Appendix A). Dropping such an assumption, we still have the uniqueness and equivalence of total sales of electricity, consumers' surplus and social welfare.
Numerical Example
In this section, we present a simple example to illustrate the equivalence of modified load-based, modified source-based and first-seller approaches. We also compare them with three other scenarios: the pure load-based, pure source-based and no-cap scenarios.
Assumptions
We assume there are three zones (i = { CA,NW,SW) connected with transmission lines with fixed capacities (Figure 1 ). Zone CA is the regulated zone (referred to below as "in-state" or California), and zones NW (Pacific Northwest) and SW (Southwest) are unregulated but trade with zone CA (and are jointly referred to as "out-of-state"). A number of generating units (h = {1, 2, ..., 10}) are located in each zone owned by firms (f = {1, 2, 3}). We allow firms to own generating assets in different locations. Consumers reside in each zone with their willingness-to-pay represented by linear inverse demand curves. For simplicity, we model the markets for a single hour. A larger model with varying load over a number of hours could readily be solved, but would not provide additional insight. Network of the numeric example.
The specific input assumptions used in this example are presented in the Appendix C. Figure  2 plots marginal cost against cumulative capacity with the corresponding CO 2 emissions rates for zones CA, B and SW, respectively. The marginal cost for zone CA ranges between 35 $/MWh and 55 $/MWh with a stable emissions rate around 550 kg/MWh. Zone NW has two types of generating technologies: hydropower with zero variable production cost and zero emissions, and moderately expensive units with a marginal cost and emissions rate of approximately 25 $/MWh and 550 kgs/MWh, respectively. Zone SW has units with higher emissions but lower costs. The capacity-weighted average CO 2 emissions rate is 582, 367 and 1,171 kg/MWh for zones CA, NW and SW, respectively. (These numbers are typical values for coal, combined-cycled and combustion turbine technologies.) Thus, whereas zone CA is designed to resemble California's electricity system primarily with natural gas plants, zones NW and SW represent northwest and southwest states with abundant hydropower and coal plants, respectively. In the baseline (or nocap) case, roughly 20% and 10% of the electricity demand in zone CA is met by imports from zone NW and SW, respectively. This is an exaggeration of the actual conditions in the western market, but it allows us to investigate possible contract shuffling and carbon leakage. We assume a demand elasticity of -0.2 at the price-quantity pair in the baseline solution.
We simulate six scenarios. In scenarios 1-3, zone CA is subject to an emissions cap of 400 tons under modified load-based, modified source-based, and first-seller approaches, respectively. An additional three scenarios are designed to illustrate the cases when there are pure load-and sourcebased programs or no cap at all. First, in scenario 4, a 400-ton emissions cap is imposed exclusively on the in-state LSEs with no restriction on emissions associated with exported electricity (Pure Load-Based ). Second, in scenario 5, we impose a 400-ton cap on just in-state emissions sources (Pure Source-Based ). Finally, scenario 6 has no emissions cap on either in-and out-of-state sources. In next section, we report the results, including electricity and CO 2 allowances prices, sales, CO 2 emissions, CO 2 leakage and contract shuffling and welfare outcomes. The results of 1-3 and 4-6 scenarios are displayed in Tables 2 and 3 , respectively.
Figure 2
Plots of marginal cost and CO2 emissions rate against cumulative capacity in zones CA, NW and SW.
Results
This section reports the results of the six scenarios. We report price and welfare results in Section 4.2.1 and address the equivalence of three proposed programs in Section 4.2.2, followed by discussion of CO 2 leakage and contract shuffling in Section 4.2.3.
Electricity and Allowances Prices and Social Welfare Analysis
The extent to which electricity prices would increase under emissions trading depends on the level of allowances prices as well as the emissions rate of the marginal unit that determines the electricity price. As for the level of allowances prices, it depends on how the programs are designed. In particular, the key parameter is whether the in-state to out-of-state and out-of-state to in-state electricity sales are regulated under the emissions programs. Overall, higher allowances prices (and thus, higher electricity prices) occur in the three approaches that regulate imports to zone CA (modified load-and source-based and first-seller based), as shown in Table 2 . When comparing to pure load-based and pure source-based scenarios, zone CA's electricity price increases by $5.8/MWh (=78.1-72.3) and $24.1/MWh (=78.1-54), respectively. This is primarily because in-state to out-of-state (e.g., CA to NW) and out-of-state to in-state (e.g., SW to CA) electricity sales are not regulated under the pure load-and source-based programs, respectively, while both types of transactions are regulated under the first-seller and modified load-and modified source-based approaches.
The level of allowances prices under the pure source-based approach relative to the pure loadbased program depends on the relative costs of in-state and out-of-state generating sources (i.e., the direction of flow). The allowances price under the first-seller (or modified source-based or load-based) approach is $61.0/ton when cross-state electricity sales in both directions are under regulation. Under the pure load-based approach, exports from from zone CA to zones NW and SW increase (since such exports incur no CO 2 cots); this would suppress the demand for CO 2 allowances, and thus reduce allowance prices. Yet, since zone CA is a net importer, the effect on allowances prices would be minor (i.e., dropping from $61.0/ton to $52.3/ton). In contrast, increased out-of-state imports to CA that result from not to the cap under a pure source-based approach would significantly suppress demand for CO 2 allowances, and thus, the allowances price drops even further (i.e., from $61.0/ton to $12.5/ton). In a more extreme case in which the out-of-state sources can meet a significant portion of zone CA's load while transmission constraints are not binding, the allowances price under a pure source-based system that applies just to zone CA could crash to zero.
The welfare analysis shows that the overall social welfare (the sum of consumer, producer, LSE and ISO's surpluses) is higher in the pure load-and source-based programs than in the modified programs. This is only because emissions externality are not included in the welfare calculation, and the emissions reductions are smaller in the pure programs, which reduces production costs. The pure source-based program has only a slightly lower social welfare than the no-cap baseline. However, this is not to say that the pure programs are superior. If the policy goal is to control CO 2 emissions in the WECC region or beyond California state territory, first-seller, modified load-based and modified source-based approaches would be appropriate since they allow agencies to reach out and to regulate transactions in both directions. (As for allocative inefficiency due to higher power prices under modified approaches, it is in the magnitude of 4.9, 18 and 22% compared to pure load-based, pure source-based and no-cap cases, respectively.
As shown in Table 2 , the total welfare gained in the first-seller, modified load-based and modified source-based approaches is the same. This total amount is distributed differently among producers, consumers, LSEs and the ISO because different parties receive free allowances in each of the systems. If instead all allowance rents were returned to consumers, then each market participant would have the same net benefits in each scenario, and consumers' surplus would increase by the amount of that rent (from $109,000 to $133,000). We discuss this particular comparison in more detail in the next section.
Equivalence of First-seller, Modified Load-based and Modified
Source-based Approach As indicated in Section 2, the first-seller, modified load-based and modified source-based approaches share the following characteristic: all regulate in-state to out-ofstate and out-of-state to in-state electricity sales, even though their point-of-regulation is different. Nevertheless, the three approaches differ in two aspects. First, although the total sales (i.e., Total Sales in Table 2 ), and thus, retail electricity prices are the same in the three approaches, the distribution of bilateral generator-LSE electricity sales could be different as implied by Theorem 2 in Section 3. However, the pattern of generation and total production costs are unaffected.
Second, the distribution of economic rents among market parties is different even though the total social welfare is equal under three cases. This basically results because the distribution of allowance rents ($61/ton times the 400 ton cap = $24,400) differs among the three solutions in Table 2 . In particular, the decision as to who should retain the LSEs' profits (i.e., (7) and (12) in the modified load-based and firstseller approaches and how producers are allocated allowances are important policy questions that affect the distribution of allowance rents. If, on one hand, producers receive all allowances for free and LSEs purchase allowances from producers in compliance with the first-seller requirement, the LSE's economic rents of $24,383 and $5,040 under the modified load-based and first-seller program, respectively, should instead be incorporated into the producers' surplus. On the other hand, if allowances are first given to consumers, and producers and LSEs must then purchase those allowances from consumers (perhaps via a state-administered auction), the allowances rents will accrue to consumers and will partially compensate for the pass-through of CO 2 allowances costs. Hence, those three programs will be equivalent from the perspective of welfare distribution if a consistent set of assumptions is made concerning the distribution of allowances rents. (Wolak et al. (Appendix) analyze load-and source-based programs assuming a closed system with inelastic loads and only bilateral trading. They conclude that if allowances are owned by consumers, and producers need to purchase allowances from consumers, the two systems are economically equivalent (25) . But they also point out a number of practical and important disadvantages of load-based systems, including impacts on the efficiency of the pool-typed markets.)
Contract Shuffling and CO 2 Leakage
The distribution of emissions among zones under different programs is a consequence of how the programs are designed and the degree of transmission congestion. We examine total emission, contract shuffling and emissions leakage in this section. Overall emissions reflect how stringent the program is designed, and its impact on the market. As the modied approaches are most stringent, the total emission is 1443.1 tons, which is 2.2, 5.2 and 6.9% less than pure load-based, pure source-based and no-cap scenarios. As discussed below, these differences are remarkably low due to contract shuffling and CO 2 leakage.
In electricity markets, most sales are financial transactions since actual flows in the network must follow physical laws. Contract shuffling in the current context refers to the situation in which the rearrangement of financial contracts results in no actual emissions reduction in an emissions trading program. Whether contract shuffling would occur under different cases can be analyzed by examining variables z f ihj in the models. Here, we sum variables z f ihj over subscripts f and h to get electricity sales (s ij ) from i to j (see Electricity Sales in Tables 2 and 3) .
We focus on a comparison of the no-cap case in Table 3 with other approaches in Tables 2 and  3 . First, we consider the issue of leakage, and then turn to contract shuffling.
Consistent with definitions elsewhere (22), we defined leakage as the difference between the decrease in regulated emissions and the decrease in total regional emissions. That is, increases in unregulated emissions elsewhere could, to some degree, offset the decline in regulated emissions. Table 3 Summary of market equilibria under no-cap, pure source-based and pure load-based programs. To obtain a gross indicator of leakage, we first calculate for each of the load-, source-and firstseller-based proposals the decrease in emissions of generators in zone CA plus imports to zone CA, compared to the no-cap case (row 2 of Table 4 , called E 1 ). These are the emissions that are subject to regulation in the modified and first-seller proposals (Table 2) , and for consistency, we also consider them for the pure source-and load-based proposals (Table 3) . We then calculate the total decrease in emissions in zones CA+NW+SW relative to the no-cap case (row 4 of Table 4 , called E 2 ). The percentage leakage is then 100%(1 − E 2 /E 1 ). Table 4 shows that in all cases most of the apparent emission reductions in regulated emissions are lost due to leakage -i.e., increases in nonregulated emissions. For instance, for the modifiedand first-seller-based proposals (Table 2) , the leakage is 85%. This is because regulated emissions fall from 1,056 tons (no-cap case) to 400 tons (the cap), but total emissions fall by much less (1,551 to 1,443) . Thus, leakage results in overall emissions reduction remarkably low, 108(=1551-1443), 76 and 29 tons for modified-, pure-load, pure-source based approaches, respectively.
This leakage is in large measure due to contract shuffling. We define contract shuffling as the difference between the apparent decrease in emissions associated with power imports to zone CA (called E 3 in Table 4 ) and the actual decrease in emissions in zones NW and SW (E 4 in Table 4 ). In our simulations, emissions in zones NW and SW are actually unchanged, even though the emissions associated with bilateral transactions from zones NW and SW to zone CA decrease. If we define the percentage of contract shuffling as 100%(1 − E 4 /E 3 ), then this percentage is actually equal to 100%. Thus, the apparent emissions decreases due to changes in the composition of imports to zone CA are completely illusory, as emissions elsewhere are actually increasing under regulation.
For example, the percentage of contract reshuffling for the modified-and first-seller-based proposals (Table 2) is 100% (last row, Table 4 ). This is because although emissions associated with imports by zone CA fall from 680 tons (no-cap) to 83 tons (Table 2) , emissions in zones NW and SW actually approximately unchanged (1,125 tons=78.7 (from B)+601.3 (from C) ). This occurs because the large amounts of dirty power that used to be exported from zone SW to zone CA in the no-cap case (512 MWh, Table 3 ) is diverted to zone NW under regulation. As a result, zone NW is then able export more of its clean power to zone CA (compare Tables 2 and 3 ). Of course, these are financial transactions, and the shifts in physical power flows are much less dramatic. (The distribution of bilateral contracts in the no-cap model is not unique, which implies that the calculations of leakage and contract shuffling in this section are also not unique. For instance, if a no-cap solution with more zone NW to CA bilateral contracts was instead used as the baseline, then the estimated amounts of leakage and shuffling would be smaller. However, these illustrative calculations demonstrate that large amounts of leakage and contract shuffling are very likely to occur under these regulatory proposals.)
Conclusion and Discussion
California is considering three proposals to regulate greenhouse gasses emitted by electric power plants under the Assembly Bill 32: source-based, load-based and first-seller approaches. These three proposals differ by their point-of-regulation and possibly the "jurisdiction" of the regulation. Our interpretation is that the three proposals will regulate emissions associated with in-state and cross-state electricity transactions. However, if in-state to out-of-state sales or vice versa are not subject to a cap, greater amounts of contract shuffling and CO 2 leakage with fewer real emissions reductions could possibly occur as shown in the pure load-based and pure source-based scenarios simulated in Section 4.
We have formulated equilibrium models for the three proposals. In addition to existence and uniqueness properties of the solutions, this paper shows that the three proposals are essentially equivalent in that they produce the same zonal sales, the same production and emission patterns, Table 4 Leakage and Reshuffling Results, Scenarios 1-6 the same allowance and retail electricity prices and the same social surplus. This occurs under the assumption that imports to California would be subject to the emissions cap, as well as sales from California plants to other states. However, the proposals can differ in the distribution of social surplus; when this occurs, it is because of assumptions concerning the distribution of allowance rents. If the markets are designed so that all emissions allowance rents accrue to consumers, then the consumer surplus is the same in all three proposals.
This points out the importance of the issue of allowance allocation. The value of those allowances could represent a significant amount of wealth transfer and might also affect program's political feasibility and acceptability. For instance, it has been shown that significant windfall profits were earned by generators in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in 2005 given that generators received most allowances for free (23) . Additionally, for first-seller and source-based approaches to survive a legal challenge, it is reasonable to conjecture that allowances need to be distributed by auctions. That is, it will be less contestable under the interstate commence laws. Otherwise, in-state sources would be given a financial windfall that their counterparts in neighboring states would not obtain if allowances are grandfathered.
Another assumption made in this paper is that the CO 2 intensity of imported electricity can be unambiguously determined. This may prove to be a challenging task in reality given the complicated operations of the competitive electricity markets. At least two proposals (e.g., TEAC and CO 2 RC) have suggested using a default emission rate. In this modelling framework, this is equivalent to assigning a uniform emissions rate to all the out-of-state sources. However, the conclusion about the equivalence of three proposed programs will remain intact.
As California has traditionally been a leader in pioneering new environmental policies in the U.S., if the policy goal is to control regional greenhouse gas emissions in the West, a California-only emissions trading program may prove to have little impact on overall greenhouse gas emissions while possibly disrupting electricity market operations, as argued by Wolak et al.(25) . In contrast, if the policy goal to take the lead with the hope that a comprehensive federal CO 2 cap-and-trade will follow in near future, careful consideration should be given to how the AB32 program should be designed to minimize interference with the operations of competitive electricity markets and reduce the chance that California consumers will suffer from additional electricity price increases. 
We denote the above problem as M LCP (M, N, q, U, V, r).
A special case of an MLCP is M LCP (M, N, q, −N T , 0, r), which has some important properties as shown below. We summarize some known results and facts that are used to prove the main theorems. ), the following is true.
Proof. By Lemma 1 we know that a solution exists to M LCP (M, N, q, −N T , 0, r). The rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 3.1.7 in Cottle et al. (11) . 2 For the remaining section, we assume that the cost function is as given in Section 3 (equation (19)), with d f i > 0 for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N . To prove the theorems presented in Section (3), we first introduce the MLCP formulation of the modified source-based, modified load-based and first-seller models. Note that the variable representing transmission charges, w, can be replaced by variables λ and η, and hence, eliminated from any of the three models. Similarly, the variables of power shipped over transmission lines, y, can be replaced by the sales variables (s or x) , according to the market clearing conditions. Let {SB, LB, F S} denote the set of the three models. Then for m ∈ {SB, LB, F S}, the three models can be represented by an MLCP with the same structure.
The variables in the MLCP are as follows. 
. Then the detailed expression of the parameters are as follows.
where I represents the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions, and
, where m ∈ {LB, F S} .
We first provide details on the off-diagonal block matrices of the M matrices.
denote the matrix of P T DF 's. Then
Assume that the vector The M x matrix is the same across the three models, and it is a block-diagonal matrix as follows.
Lemma 3. The matrix M m , for each m ∈ {SB, LB, F S}, is positive semi-definite. . Suppose that (s, θ, x, ρ, w, y, η, λ, p CO 2 ) solves Model SB. First consider a s f j > 0, with f ∈ F and j ∈ N . By complementarity in firm f 's first order condition (3), we have that θ f j =p j − w j , and for the particular f and j,
For a s f j = 0, by nonnegativity of x f ij , we have that x f ij = 0, ∀ i ∈ N . Now for each f ∈ F, i, j ∈ N , let z f ij = x f ij and define p f ij as follows
Then clearly (z, x, ρ, w, y, η, λ, p CO 2 , p) satisfies all the equality and complementarity conditions of Model LB. Hence, it solves Model LB.
(b) ⇒ (c). Assume that (z, x, ρ, w, y, η, λ, p
Then it is easy to see that (z, x, ρ, w, y, η, λ, p
and j ∈ N C with z f ij > 0, by the LSE j's first-order condition, we have that Further define that for each f ∈ F and j ∈ N , s f j = i∈N x f ij and θ f j =p j − w j . The complementarity constraints on s variables in formulation (3) are be seen to be satisfied. It is then trivial to show that (s, θ, x, ρ, w, y, η, λ, p CO 2 ) solves Model SB. 2 
By adding the surpluses from the four parties, we note that the following pairs of quantities can be canceled in an equilibrium: consumers' costs and LSEs' revenue from power purchase and sales, LSE's cost and producers' revenue from power purchase and sales, producers payments on transmission services and ISO's revenue of auctioning off transmission services, and CO 2 allowance purchases and sales. The CO 2 allowance purchases and sales can be canceled due to the marketing clearing condition (17) for the first-seller model, (condition (6) for the modified source-based model and condition (11) for the modified load-based model) and the assumption
As a result, we arrive at the following expressions for social welfare, denoted as SW . Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS By the uniqueness of the total sales at a zone j and total generation at a zone i in an equilibrium to each of the three models, the uniqueness of social welfare follows. The equivalence of social welfare across the equilibria to the three models also readily follow by the results shown in (a) and (b). 2
Appendix B: A Degenerate Example
In the following we present an example of a degenerate network in which ISO's surplus, producers' surplus and the market-clearing price of CO 2 may not be unique. Consider a network consisting of two nodes and one transmission line that connects them, as illustrated in Figure 3 . 
Suppose each plant has a 50 MW capacity constraint. Then the marginal cost of producer A is strictly less than that of producer B, given a generation level x ∈ [0, 50 MW]. Further assume that the emissions rate for plant A is 1 ton/MWh, while 0 for plant B. Hence, plant B is more expensive, but cleaner, than plant A. For illustration purposes, we only consider the market equilibrium under the source-based approach. Equilibrium conditions for the other two CO 2 cap-and-trade schemes can be derived in the same manner. Let K A and K B denote the initial CO 2 allocation for plants A and B, and assume the total cap of CO 2 emissions is 50 tons. Then their profit optimization problems in the market setting depicted in Figure 3 are as follows. The market-clearing conditions are
(s AB , g A , s BB , g B , y A , y B , w B , p B ) are unique in an equilibrium of the above system, with values at (50, 50, 50, 50, −50, 50, 0, 100). (w A , p CO 2 ), however, are not unique in equilibria. This is so because the generation capacity constraint for plant A, the transmission constraint, and the emissions cap constraint all create the same constraint x A ≤ 50. This degeneracy leads to non-unique wheeling charge at zone CA, w A , which ranges continuously within [0, $70]; and CO 2 price ranges within [0, 60$/ton] in equilibria. This example shows that unless stronger regularity conditions are imposed to the equilibrium system, uniqueness for ISO's profit, power producers' surplus, and CO 2 prices does not hold in general. 
Appendix C: Generator Characteristics and Transmission Line Data

